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1 Introduction
A company or a government agency that wants to buy a customized good has
to decide which mechanism to use to select a contractor and to determine the
price. The two most popular procurement mechanisms are auctions and direct
negotiations. The advantages of auctions are well understood. An auction
selects the bidder with the lowest cost, it achieves low prices by inducing
strong competition between bidders, and it safeguards against corruption and
favoritism because of its transparency and strict rules. For these reasons the
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which came into force in 1996
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, requires transparent,
nondiscriminatory, and open competitive tendering for the award of public
procurement orders that exceed certain thresholds.1 Due to this agreement,
nowadays, the large majority of public procurement in developed countries is
conducted by competitive tendering. In the private sector, however, auctions
are chosen far less frequently. In a recent empirical study Bajari, McMillan,
and Tadelis (2009, p. 373) report that almost half of private sector non-
residential building construction projects in Northern California from 1995 to
2000 were procured using negotiations. In this paper, we offer a new theoretical
explanation for the common use of negotiations that focuses on the exchange
of information and the inefficiencies of renegotiation.
1An agreement on government procurement was first negotiated during the Tokyo Round,
in the context of the GATT Code, and entered into force on 1 January 1981. The GPA is
a plurilateral agreement signed by, among others, Canada, the member states of the Euro-
pean Union and the European Commission, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, and
the United States (Audet, 2002). In the United States public procurement in accordance
with the GPA is regulated by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. In the European Union
three directives prescribe the rules for public procurement orders, which are often stricter
than the GPA rules; Directive 2014/24/EU (Public Sector), Directive 2014/25/EU (Utili-
ties), and Directive 2014/23/EU (concession contracts). For more details regarding public
procurement in the EU see Drijber and Stergiou (2009).
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When customized goods or services such as a building, a custom-made soft-
ware or consultancy services are to be procured, the exchange of information
between the buyer and the contractor is of crucial importance. Ex ante there
are many possible designs of the project. Often the buyer is not aware of all
design possibilities and she may lack important technical information. Sellers
have complementary skills and information that can be very useful to specify
the project efficiently.2 If the buyer decides to run an auction, a potential bid-
der has little incentive to communicate his ideas before winning the auction.
In fact if a seller has an idea for a design improvement he will strategically
hold back this information because it gives him an advantage over his rivals
in the bidding process. If he wins the auction, he can use his information for
making additional profits by offering to renegotiate the design. Thus, when
the buyer prepares the auction she has to fix a specification of the good that is
likely to be suboptimal. Not surprisingly, procurement contracts are frequently
renegotiated giving rise to substantial design changes and cost increases.
If renegotiation is costless and yields an efficient outcome, there is no prob-
lem: The buyer and the contractor always renegotiate to the efficient design, no
matter what the initial contract specifies. Furthermore, the seller with the best
idea for a design improvement is likely to win the auction. He would gain most
from renegotiating the contract and therefore bid most aggressively. However,
there is substantial evidence that contract renegotiation is often costly and
inefficient. In an empirical analysis of highway procurement contracts in Cal-
ifornia Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014, p. 1317) estimate that the costs
of renegotiation “range from 55 cents to around two dollars for every dollar in
2This was first pointed out by Goldberg (1977). Sweet (1994) describes the problem
as follows: “[s]eparation of design and construction deprives the owner of contractor skill
during the design process, such as sensitivity to the labor and material markets, knowledge
of construction techniques, and their advantages, disadvantages and costs. A contractor
would also have the ability to evaluate the coherence and completeness of the design, and,
most importantly, the costs of any design proposed.”
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change”. Renegotiation is costly for two reasons: First, it disrupts the orig-
inally planned work and affects the contractual obligations of the buyer and
the seller to other parties. Second, it gives rise to conflicts over who should
bare the additional costs. These disputes gobble up additional resources for
lawyers and arbitrators and slow down the completion of the project.
In contrast, if the buyer negotiates the contract with a selected seller, the
two parties typically spend a lot of time discussing the optimal design of the
project before the contract is signed. Thus, there is less need for costly rene-
gotiation ex post. This is why practitioners and handbooks of procurement
often recommend using negotiations for the procurement of complex projects.3
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model with costly and inefficient
renegotiation that allows us to analyze the costs and benefits of auctions and
negotiations as procurement mechanisms. With an auction a seller will never
reveal possible project improvements to the buyer before the contract is signed
because the contract turns a highly competitive situation (the auction) into
a bilateral monopoly (the renegotiation game). In contrast, with negotiations
the seller will share his information with the buyer before the contract is writ-
ten. Here the buyer and the seller are in a bilateral monopoly position from
the start. If the seller withholds information in order to renegotiate later, he
reduces the social surplus but his share of the surplus is unchanged. Thus,
negotiations avoid costly renegotiation, but at the price of less ex ante com-
petition. This is the first tradeoff that we identify: If renegotiation is costless
auctions outperform negotiations because they induce more competition and
lower prices. However, if renegotiation is costly, negotiations can be superior.
This is more likely to be the case if design improvements are important, if
renegotiation costs are large, and if the buyer’s bargaining position is strong.
3In the Handbook of Procurement Bajari and Tadelis (2006, p. 133) offer “Practical
conclusion 7: For complex projects for which the expertise and input of an experienced
supplier is essential at the design stage, favour a cost-plus contract to be awarded using a
negotiation with a reputable supplier.”
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In the second part of the paper we consider the incentives of (potential)
sellers to invest into finding design improvements. This gives rise to a second
tradeoff. We show that a seller who negotiates with a buyer always has a
stronger incentive to invest than any seller participating in the auction. This is
due to the fact that the return of this investment is diminished in the auction
because renegotiation is inefficient. Furthermore there is a discouragement
effect of the auction: the more sellers are participating in the auction, the
smaller is the incentive for each bidder to invest. On the other hand, there is
also a sampling effect. The more bidders there are, the more likely it is that
at least one of them finds the design improvement (keeping the investment of
each bidder constant). Negotiations are more likely to give rise to a higher
probability of finding the project improvement if the cost of renegotiation is
high.
Related literature: There is an extensive literature on the optimal design of
procurement contracts, see e.g. McAfee and McMillan (1986) and Laffont and
Tirole (1993). These mechanism design approaches do not consider how the
optimal procurement contract is allocated, i.e. they assume that the allocation
procedure does not affect the performance of the contract. In contrast, our
paper shows that the performance of a contract may depend on how it is
allocated.
The seminal contribution comparing auctions and negotiations is Bulow
and Klemperer (1996). They show that an open English auction with n +
1 bidders yields higher revenues than an optimally designed auction with n
bidders. This result implies that a simple auction with at least two bidders
is better than optimally structured bilateral negotiations—i.e., the value of
negotiation skill is small relative to the value of additional competition.4 We
4Bulow and Klemperer (2009) directly compare a simple simultaneous auction to se-
quential negotiations when participation is costly. The auction generates higher expected
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show that this argument extends to the case of an incomplete contract (that
needs to be renegotiated) if renegotiation is efficient. However, if renegotiation
is costly and inefficient, the buyer can be better off to forgo competition and
to negotiate with one seller.
Manelli and Vincent (1995) point to a potential disadvantage of auctions
that arises if quality is unobservable ex ante and not verifiable by a third
party ex post. If quality and production costs are positively correlated the
seller with the lowest costs (who is going to win the auction) is likely to offer
low quality. Manelli and Vincent (1995) show that there are conditions under
which the optimal mechanism is a bargaining process, where the buyer can
make take-it-or-leave it offers sequentially to each seller. In our setup there is
no unobservable quality, so this problem does not arise.
The paper most closely related to ours is Bajari and Tadelis (2001). In their
model, as well as in ours, the procurement contract is incomplete and renegoti-
ation is costly. The focus of Bajari and Tadelis (2001) is on problems of ex post
adaptation, when the initial design is endogenously incomplete. They do not
consider different award procedures but compare the performance of two types
of contracts, fixed-price and cost-plus contracts. If the good that the buyer
wants to procure is a standardized or rather simple good, the buyer should use
a fixed-price contract that gives strong cost saving incentives to the seller. If
the good is complex, however, the procurement contract is likely to be rene-
gotiated. In their model renegotiation is plagued by asymmetric information.
Thus, with a fixed-price contract renegotiation fails with positive probability
giving rise to an inefficient outcome. With a cost-plus contract, on the other
hand, renegotiation is always efficient because the seller is automatically re-
imbursed for any cost increase. The cost-plus contract, however, gives no cost
saving incentives to the seller because all additional costs are borne by the
revenues but is less desirable from a welfare point of view. A similar finding is obtained by
Pagnozzi and Rosato (2014) in the context of firm takeovers.
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buyer. The authors show that if the cost of renegotiation is sufficiently large,
a cost-plus contract outperforms a fixed-price contract. Our model differs in
three important respects from Bajari and Tadelis (2001). First, we investigate
how the procurement contract should be awarded, which is not an issue in
their paper. Second, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) focus on ex post asymmetries
of information arising during the execution of the project, while we are inter-
ested in the efficient design of the project ex ante. Finally, in their model the
information structure is exogenously given while we endogenize the incentives
of the sellers to find project improvements.
Our paper is also related to some strands of the literature on incomplete
contracts and renegotiation. Tirole (2009) derives contracts that are endoge-
nously incomplete. In his model (as in ours) the contracting parties are un-
aware of the ex post optimal design, but they are aware that they are unaware.
They can invest mental resources ex ante in order to figure out early what the
ex post optimal design is. If one party discovers the optimal design, the enun-
ciation of the design is an “eye-opener” to the other party. Thus, if a party
suggests contracting on this design, it gives the information away and cannot
fully benefit from it, in the same way as an inventor in Arrow (1962) can-
not fully benefit from his invention because he has to reveal it in order to
contract on it. In Tirole (2009) the optimal design of the project becomes
common knowledge automatically ex post, while in our model the seller has to
find and reveal the optimal design to the buyer. This is why in Tirole (2009)
there can be inefficiently high incentives to discover the ex post optimal design
(contracts are “too complete”), which is not the case in our model. Moreover,
Tirole only considers negotiations between one buyer and one seller. We com-
pare negotiations to auctions and focus on the incentives of sellers to reveal
their information early rather than late. In particular, we investigate the ineffi-
ciencies caused by deferred information revelation due to costly renegotiation,
which does not play a role in Tirole’s model.
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Moreover, our paper builds on the literature on contracts as reference points
and ex post inefficiencies. Hart and Moore (2008) argue that a contract pro-
vides a reference point. The contracting parties have self-serving biases in the
interpretation of the contract that give rise to conflicts and inefficient behavior
ex post. Building on the idea that contracts are reference points, Herweg and
Schmidt (2014) propose a theory of inefficient renegotiation. If two parties
renegotiate a contract they compare the renegotiation proposal to the initial
contract. This comparison is distorted by loss aversion which gives rise to an
inefficient renegotiation outcome. In Herweg and Schmidt (2014) we ask how
the initial contract should be structured in order to minimize the inefficiencies
of the renegotiation process. In contrast, in the current paper we keep the
contract fixed and show that the cost of renegotiation is affected by how the
contract is allocated (by auction or by negotiation).
There are a few empirical papers comparing auctions and negotiations in
procurement. Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2009) look at a comprehensive
data set of private sector building contracts in Northern California. They re-
port that the more complex the project is the more likely it is to be awarded
by negotiation than by auction.5 On the other hand, auctions are more likely
to be used if there are more potential sellers. Similar findings are obtained by
Leffler, Rucker, and Munn (2003) for private sales of timber in North Carolina
and by Chong, Staropoli, and Yvrande-Billon (2014) for public building con-
tracts in France. Lalive and Schmutzler (2011) consider the procurement of
public transport in Germany and report that auctions yield significantly lower
prices than negotiations. Finally, Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) study
highway paving contracts in Northern California that are awarded by auction.
They report that these contracts are often renegotiated and that renegotiation
5Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2009, p. 372) argue that auctions perform poorly because
they “stifle communication between buyers and sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing
the contractor’s expertise when designing the project”, but they do not offer a theoretical
explanation for this observation. This is where our paper steps in.
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yields significant adaptation costs of 7.5 to 14 percent of the winning bid. All
of these findings are consistent with our theoretical results and our modeling
approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 sets up the
baseline model and discusses our modeling assumptions. In Section 3 the
baseline model is solved by backwards induction, i.e., we first characterize the
outcome of renegotiation, then sellers’ incentives for information disclosure are
analyzed, and finally we compare the performance of auction and negotiation.
In Section 4 we augment the baseline model by allowing sellers to invest into
finding project improvements. The final Section 5 concludes. All proofs are
relegated to the Appendix A.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Procurement Operator and Potential Contractors
A buyer (B) wants to procure a complex project that is tailored to her specific
needs, such as a particular building, a tailor made software program, or a
custom made component needed in production. The project can be executed by
n ≥ 2 potential sellers, denoted by Si with i = 1, . . . , n. We assume that sellers
are symmetric and have the same cost function c(·), which depends on the
implemented specification of the project.6 The seller who is selected to carry
out the project is called the contractor (he). The buyer’s (she) gross benefit is
v(·), which also depends on the specification of the project. Without receiving
additional information, the buyer believes that specification ȳ maximizes the
social surplus, i.e., the buyer wants to procure ȳ in this case. The specification
ȳ gives rise to gross benefit v(ȳ) = v̄, cost c(ȳ) = c̄, and social surplus S̄ = v̄−c̄.
6The assumption that all sellers are symmetric is made for simplicity only. It strengthens
the case for auctions because in this case an auction gives all the surplus to the buyer. We
briefly discuss the case of asymmetric sellers in the conclusions.
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The outside option utilities of all parties are normalized to zero.
Sellers often have additional skills and knowledge and may be able to come
up with a more efficient project than project ȳ. The buyer lacks these skills
and knowledge and therefore is unaware of these alternative specifications,
which might also be a reason for why the project is procured from an outside
firm and not produced in-house. We model this as follows: Each seller may
be aware of a set of superior specifications Y , where all specifications y ∈ Y
lead to a higher social surplus than ȳ. Moreover, to avoid uninteresting case
distinctions, we posit that all projects y ∈ Y yield a higher benefit for the
buyer but are also more costly to produce for the seller than product ȳ.7
Assumption 1. For all project specifications in the superior set, y ∈ Y , it
holds that:
(i) v(y)− c(y) > v̄ − c̄;
(ii) c(y) > c̄.
Assumption 1 implies that for all y ∈ Y we have v(y) > v̄. To begin with,
we posit that each seller is aware of the set of superior specifications with
exogenous probability q ∈ (0, 1). Later, we endogenize the probabilities with
which sellers are aware of superior project specifications. For each seller Si an
independent draw by nature determines whether a seller knows Y or not. The
knowledge of Y is private information of a seller.
Suppose that a seller did find superior projects Y and revealed them to the
buyer ex ante. Now, if the buyer wants to procure a project y ∈ Y , all sellers
can produce this project at the same cost c(y)—even sellers who initially were
not aware of the set of projects Y . A project specification y corresponds to
7It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case where y reduces the buyer’s
benefit but reduces the seller’s cost even more, or where y increases the buyer’s benefit and
decreases the seller’s cost. See Herweg and Schmidt (2014) for a formal analysis of costly
renegotiation in these cases.
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an innovative idea on how the project could be specified. Once the innovative
specification is explained to an unaware seller, the seller understands the new
idea (“his eyes are opened”) and he can execute this specification at the same
costs as a seller who initially came up with the idea. A crucial question is
whether an informed seller has an incentive to reveal the superior set Y to the
buyer before concluding a contract or only afterwards. If he informs the buyer
about the set of superior projects Y before the initial contract is signed, the
buyer wants to procure project
y∗ ∈ arg max
y∈Y
{v(y)− c(y)} (1)
that gives rise to social surplus S∗ = v∗ − c∗ > S̄, where v(y∗) = v∗ and
c(y∗) = c∗. Define
∆S∗ = S∗ − S̄ (2)
as the maximal additional surplus that can be generated due to the superior
project. If none of the sellers informed the buyer about the existence of possible
superior projects ex ante, the buyer procures project ȳ. In this case, after the
contract on ȳ has been concluded, the contractor can still reveal Y and propose
to renegotiate. A crucial assumption we impose is that the buyer is unaware
of the specifications that the superior projects may take.8 Nevertheless, the
buyer is aware that she is unaware, i.e., she knows that sellers may be aware of
superior specifications, but she does not know how these superior specifications
may look like.9
8The buyer faces radical uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921).
9In the language of former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the potential
superior project is a“known unknown”: “We also know there are known unknowns; that is to
say we know there are some things we do not know.” See Defense.gov News Transcript, DoD





The buyer can use one of two mechanisms to conclude the procurement con-
tract: Either an auction (A) or bilateral negotiations (N).
If B uses an auction, she runs a sealed-bid second-price auction for a project
specification ŷ—i.e., the seller who offers the lowest price is awarded the con-
tract and receives the price offered by the second lowest bidder. If several
bidders make the same lowest bid, one of them is selected at random. In gen-
eral, a cost-minimizing auction involves setting a maximum bid. However, in
our model all sellers have the same cost function. Thus, if the surplus from
good ȳ is sufficiently high, the optimal maximum bid for the procurement of
good ȳ is simply c(ȳ) = c̄, which never precludes a seller from participating
in the auction. Therefore, a second-price auction without a maximum bid is
without loss of generality. Crucially, in our setting, the buyer cannot use a
scoring auction. In a scoring auction the seller who places the bid (y, p) with
the highest score f(y, p) wins the auction, where f(y, p) is the scoring func-
tion. For example, if the buyer could set f(y, p) = v(y) − p, then the seller
offering the highest surplus to the buyer would win the auction. However, we
are looking at a situation where the buyer is not aware of all possible design
specifications. She cannot specify a scoring function f(y, p) for y ∈ Y ex ante
because she is unaware of y ∈ Y .10
On the other hand, if the buyer decides to negotiate the procurement con-
tract, she picks one seller at random, i.e., each seller is selected with probability
10There are several additional problems with the implementation of scoring auctions.
Scoring auctions can be used for dimensions of quality that are contractible ex ante and
verifiable ex post, e.g. the size or resolution of a computer screen or the fuel efficiency of
an engine. It cannot be used for quality dimensions that are non-contractible and/or non-
verifiable, such as the aesthetics of a building, the appeal of a marketing strategy, or the
quality of a consulting project. Furthermore, scoring auctions are prone to corruption and
favoritism. See Dini, Picini, and Valletti (2006) for a more extensive discussion of scoring
auctions.
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1/n. We employ the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (GNBS) to char-
acterize the bargaining outcome. Let the buyer’s relative bargaining power be
α ∈ (0, 1).11
2.3 Time Structure
The time structure of the model is as follows:
(0) At stage 0 the buyer decides which procurement mechanism to use, A or
N . The choice is publicly announced, but the exact procurement contract
is not yet specified. If mechanism N is used, B randomly selects one
seller i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with whom to negotiate a contract. In this case
the buyer commits to negotiate the procurement contract solely with
the selected contractor. The other sellers exit the game. If the buyer
chooses to run an auction, all sellers can participate in the auction and
the buyer commits to awarding the contract to the bidder offering the
lowest price.12
(1) At stage 1, nature determines by an independent draw for each potential
seller whether this seller becomes aware of the set of superior specifi-
cations Y or not. If a seller knows a project improvement he decides
whether or not to tell the buyer about it.
(2) At stage 2 the procurement mechanism is executed. In case of an auc-
tion the buyer auctions the procurement order for project ȳ if she is
11In Appendix B we show that the GNBS gives rise to the same bargaining outcome as a
non-cooperative bargaining game in which the buyer (seller) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
with probability α (1− α), respectively.
12The assumption that the buyer can commit to a mechanism is standard in the literature
on auctions and mechanism design. In practice this commitment can be achieved if the
buyer is afraid to lose her reputation as a trustworthy contracting partner or if she signs
a pre-contract that debars her from legally entering into a similar contract at a later time
with any other party.
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uninformed and for project y∗ if she is informed about the set Y by at
least one of the sellers. Each seller i places a bid pi and the seller who
placed the lowest bid wins the auction, and the price is determined by
the second lowest bid. In case of negotiation the buyer and the selected
seller (the contractor) negotiate a specific performance contract (ŷ, p). If
B is uninformed the two parties agree to trade specification ȳ, while if
B is informed they agree to trade specification y∗.
(3) At stage 3 the parties may renegotiate. If the initial contract specifies
project y∗, there is no need for renegotiation and project y∗ is executed.
If the contract specifies ȳ, there may be scope for renegotiation. If the
contractor is aware of possible project improvements, but the buyer was
not informed at stage 1, the contractor may now inform the buyer about
Y . If the buyer learns Y , the parties renegotiate.
Note that the buyer commits to the procurement mechanism. If she chooses
to negotiate with one selected seller she cannot turn to another seller, if she
chooses an auction she cannot allocate the contract to a seller who is not the
lowest bidder.
2.4 Renegotiation
If the parties renegotiate, they split the surplus from renegotiation according
to the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (GNBS). We assume that the
relative bargaining power of the buyer in the renegotiation game does not
depend on whether the initial contract was allocated via an auction or via
negotiations, and that the buyer’s bargaining power is the same in the initial
negotiation game and in the renegotiation game. Thus, the buyer’s relative
bargaining power is always α ∈ (0, 1). Notice that with negotiation the buyer’s
relative bargaining power is the same when she negotiates at stage 2 and when
she renegotiates at stage 3. In contrast, with an auction there is a fundamental
13
transformation in the sense of Williamson (1985) —i.e., a highly competitive
situation at stage 2 turns into a bilateral monopoly at stage 3.
A crucial point of our modeling approach, next to sellers’ superior informa-
tion regarding the optimal specification, is that we posit renegotiation to be
plagued by imperfections. In other words, renegotiating a contract is costly.
There are at least two reasons for this assumption, (1) physical adjustment
costs and (2) psychological costs, e.g. caused by loss aversion.
Physical adjustment costs: Suppose that the parties signed an initial con-
tract on implementing project ȳ at price p̄. After some time the seller ap-
proaches the buyer and informs her that he found some other, more efficient
project y ∈ Y . When the parties change ȳ to y they have to incur adjustment
costs. For example, in preparation for ȳ the buyer and the seller had to make
plans how to use their resources to implement ȳ, they had to commit to a
time table that is based on ȳ and that affects other projects they are involved
in, and they had to write additional contracts with subcontractors, investors,
and/or clients that are all conditional on ȳ. Switching to a new project y and
a new price p implies that the parties have to undo some of these commitments
which is costly and disruptive.
Psychological costs: There is also a psychological cost of renegotiation.
Both parties have to make concessions. The buyer has to pay a higher price
than planned initially and the seller has to incur higher production costs.
Each party feels entitled to the concession of the other party but is reluctant to
concede itself. This gives rise to haggling and conflicts. Following Tversky and
Kahneman (1991) and Herweg and Schmidt (2014) we model this psychological
cost as loss aversion.13 When the parties renegotiate the initial contract they
13Tversky and Kahneman (1991, p. 1057) argue that “contracts define the reference levels
for [...] bargaining; in the bargaining context the aversion to losses takes the form of an
aversion to concessions”.
14
compare the renegotiation proposal (y, p) to the initial contract (ȳ, p̄). From
the perspective of the buyer the new contract offers a higher benefit v(y) >
v(ȳ), which is considered a gain, but because y is more costly to produce for
the seller it also requires a higher price p > p̄, which is considered a loss
by the buyer. Similarly, from the perspective of the seller the higher price
is considered a gain, while the higher production cost is considered a loss.
For both parties losses loom larger than gains of equal size. This drives a
wedge between the benefit of the buyer and the cost of the seller giving rise
to an inefficient renegotiation outcome. There is ample experimental and field
evidence showing that people evaluate outcomes not (only) in absolute terms
but (also) relative to a reference point, and that losses (in comparison to this
reference point) loom larger than gains of equal size.14
Empirical evidence: Several empirical studies emphasize the importance of
costly renegotiation, including Crocker and Reynolds (1993), Chakravarty and
MacLeod (2009) and Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014). Bajari, Houghton,
and Tadelis (2014) consider highway procurement contracts in California and
report that renegotiation costs are substantial. They distinguish between “di-
rect” and “indirect adaptation costs”. Direct adaptation costs are due to dis-
ruption of the originally planned work and correspond to our interpretation of
physical adjustment costs. Indirect adaptation costs are due to contract rene-
gotiation and dispute resolution and are related to the psychological cost of
renegotiation: “Each side may try to blame the other for any needed changes,
and they may disagree over the best way to change the plans and specifica-
tions. Disputes over changes may generate a breakdown in cooperation on
the project site and possible lawsuits” (Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis, 2014,
p.1294-95).
14See Herweg and Schmidt (2014) for a detailed discussion and analysis of loss aversion
in contract renegotiation.
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Modeling renegotiation costs: Following Herweg and Schmidt (2014) we
model both types of adaptation costs as follows. If the parties renegotiate
contract (ȳ, p̄) to contract (y, p) with v(y) > v(ȳ), c(y) > c(ȳ), and p > p̄, then
the final utilities of the buyer and the contractor are given by
UB(y, p) = v(y)− p− λB[p− p̄], and (3)
US(y, p) = p− c(y)− λS[c(y)− c(ȳ)], (4)
respectively. The parameter λj ≥ 0, with j ∈ {B, S}, measures how costly
renegotiation is to party j. In the first interpretation, λj measures how costly
adjustments are, while in the second interpretation it measures the degree
of loss aversion. The buyer incurs a loss that is proportional to the price
increase (e.g. because of higher costs to acquire additional financing for the
new project or because she feels the loss of the price increase more strongly
than an equally sized gain of the increase in benefits). The contractor incurs
a loss that is proportional to the increase in production costs (e.g. because
changing the project is disruptive or because he feels a loss of the cost increase
more strongly than an equally sized gain of the price increase). We choose this
specification of renegotiation costs because it allows for a unified treatment
of physical and psychological adaptation costs. Furthermore, the simplicity
of the model due to its linear structure allows us to fully characterize the
renegotiation outcome.15
15Our main findings do not rely on our specific modeling approach but hold (qualitatively)
for any model of costly renegotiation. A convincing feature of our approach is that contracts
are typically renegotiated in the light of new information and that the implemented adjust-
ments are often too small compared to the adjustments necessary to implement the first-best
specification.
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3 Analysis of the Baseline Model
We analyze symmetric pure-strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria and solve
the game by backward induction. First, we characterize the outcome of rene-
gotiation for an initial contract (ȳ, p̄). Thereafter, we investigate sellers’ incen-
tives to reveal design improvements already at stage 1 and how these incentives
differ across the two types of procurement mechanisms, auction and negoti-
ation. Finally, we analyze which mechanism maximizes the buyer’s expected
utility.
3.1 The Outcome of Renegotiation
Suppose the buyer and the contractor concluded a contract (ȳ, p̄) at stage 2.
If the contractor is unaware of a superior specification, the initial contract is
executed. If the contractor is aware of the set of superior projects Y , there is
scope for renegotiation at stage 3—i.e., the contractor reveals Y to the buyer
and the parties consider renegotiating the initial contract. Renegotiation nec-
essarily leads to a higher price because the contractor incurs higher production
costs. By the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (GNBS) the renegotiation




v(y)− v̄ − (1 + λB)(p− p̄)
}α {
p− p̄− (1 + λS)[c(y)− c̄]
}1−α
. (5)
The solution to this problem is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Outcome of Renegotiation). Let the initial contract be (ȳ, p̄).
At stage 3 the contract (yR, pR) is implemented (potentially after renegotia-
tion), with
yR ∈ arg max
y∈{Y ∪{ȳ}}





[v(yR)− v̄] + α(1 + λS)[c(yR)− c̄]. (7)
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The final payoffs are given by
UB = v̄ − p̄+ α
{
v(yR)− v̄ − (1 + λB)(1 + λS)[c(yR)− c̄]
}
(8)
US = p̄− c̄+ 1− α
1 + λB
{
v(yR)− v̄ − (1 + λB)(1 + λS)[c(yR)− c̄]
}
. (9)
Proof. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Note that if there are no adjustment costs, λB = λS = 0, the parties will
always renegotiate and the renegotiation outcome is efficient, i.e. yR = y∗.
If λB and/or λS are strictly positive, the renegotiation outcome is inefficient
because the adjustment costs drive a wedge between the benefit of the buyer
and the cost of the seller. More precisely, renegotiation takes place if and only
if there is a y ∈ Y such that16
v(y)− v̄ > (1 + λB)(1 + λS)[c(y)− c̄]. (10)
When renegotiation takes place, the renegotiated project depends on the ad-
justment cost parameters λB and λS, but it does not depend on α, the bar-
gaining power of the buyer. However, the additional surplus that is generated
through renegotiation does depend on α. If the buyer has all the bargaining
power (α = 1), the renegotiation surplus is given by
∆SR(λB, λS) ≡ v(yR)− v̄ − (1 + λB)(1 + λS)(c(yR)− c̄) ≥ 0. (11)
If the seller has some bargaining power (α < 1), the surplus from renegotiation
is reduced to 1+αλ
B
1+λB
∆SR. The reason is that a higher bargaining power of the
seller implies a higher renegotiation price for the buyer. Transfers, however,
are costly. A price increase by ∆p reduces the buyer’s utility by (1 + λB)∆p
and thus gives rise to a further welfare loss of λB∆p.
16See Proposition 1 by Herweg and Schmidt (2014).
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3.2 Information Revelation
We now turn to stage 1 and investigate whether sellers have an incentive to
reveal design improvements at stage 1 before the procurement contract is de-
termined. In order to do so, we also have to analyze the outcome at stage 2
under the two procurement mechanisms.
Negotiation: First, we consider the case where the buyer negotiates the
contract with one (randomly selected) seller. In this case, the contractor is
better off by revealing any project improvements early.
Proposition 2 (Information Disclosure in Negotiations). Suppose the buyer
negotiates the procurement contract with one seller, the contractor. Then, the
contractor has a strict incentive to reveal any project improvements early to
the buyer, i.e. before the contract is signed.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward: If the contractor
informs the buyer about possible project improvements the parties will agree
to trade the efficient project y∗ and the contractor gets fraction 1 − α of the
surplus. If the seller does not inform the buyer, the parties will contract on ȳ
initially. Now the contractor waits until stage 3 and then reveals that there
are possible project improvements and thus scope for renegotiation. However,
renegotiation is inefficient. Therefore, the seller will get fraction 1 − α of the
renegotiation surplus, additionally to fraction 1−α of the initial surplus based
on trade of ȳ. This, however, is smaller than the surplus he would have received
if he had revealed Y right away.
Auction: Consider now the case of an auction. With an auction, each seller
is better off not revealing any information about possible project improvements
until after the procurement contract has been signed.
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Proposition 3 (Information Disclosure in Auctions). Suppose the buyer runs
an auction. Then, each seller strictly prefers not to reveal possible project
improvements to the buyer before the contract has been signed.
If seller i finds a project improvement and informs the buyer about it, the
buyer auctions off project y∗. In this case each seller i bids bi = c(y
∗). Thus,
each seller gets an expected payoff of zero from the auction. If seller i does not
reveal the project improvement immediately but waits until after the auction,
he may get a strictly positive payoff in the renegotiation game. The reason is
that after the auction the competitive situation turns into a bilateral monopoly
in which the seller has some bargaining power and gets fraction 1 − α of the
renegotiation surplus. If he is the only seller who discovered possible project
improvements, this ex post rent will not be competed away in the auction and
he gets a strictly positive profit.
3.3 Auction vs. Negotiation
We now turn to the decision of the buyer whether to run an auction or to ne-
gotiate with one seller. Propositions 2 and 3 point at an important tradeoff. If
the buyer uses an auction sellers will not reveal possible project improvements
early. Thus, renegotiation is required to implement project improvements. If
renegotiation is costless this is not an issue and an auction is always optimal.
If, on the other hand, renegotiation yields an inefficient outcome, using the
auction is costly. In this case negotiations may outperform auctions because
they provide an incentive to the contractor to reveal his information early, so
costly renegotiation can be avoided. However, negotiation with one seller is
expensive because the buyer has a weaker bargaining position in negotiation
than in an auction.
In order to balance these pros and cons of negotiations in comparison to
auctions, the buyer needs to calculate her expected utility under the two mech-
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anisms. Recall that the buyer is unaware of the potentially superior projects
ex ante. Nevertheless, the buyer is aware that she is unaware and knows that
the sellers might know project specifications that are more efficient than ȳ. For
simplicity we assume that the buyer knows the additional surplus that can be
achieved by implementing a superior specification, either directly or indirectly
via renegotiation. Hence, even though the buyer is unaware of set Y ex ante,
she can calculate her expected payoff resulting from a particular procurement
mechanism.17 Formally, if the buyer negotiates, her expected payoff is
EUBN (α, q, S̄,∆S
∗) = (1− q)α(v̄ − c̄) + qα(v∗ − c∗)
= αS̄ + qα∆S∗. (12)
If the seller runs an auction, three cases have to be distinguished. With
probability (1 − q)n no seller finds a project improvement. In this case all
sellers bid bi = c̄ and the buyer’s payoff is U
B = v̄ − c̄ = S̄. With probability
nq(1− q)n−1 exactly one of the sellers finds an improvement. In this case the
successful seller gets the contract at price p̄ = c̄, but then there is renegotiation.
Thus, the buyer’s payoff is UB = v̄ − c̄ + α∆SR = S̄ + α∆SR. Finally, with
probability 1 − (1 − q)n − nq(1 − q)n−1 two or more sellers are successful.
In this case competition in the auction drives down the price to p̄ = c̄ −
1−α
1+λB
[(v(yR)− v̄)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)(c(yR)− c̄)], so the buyer’s payoff is UB =
S̄ + α∆SR + 1−α
1+λB
∆SR.18 Thus, the expected payoff of the buyer if she runs
17An experienced buyer may have a rough idea of the likelihood and the value of possible
project improvements from previous procurement situations. It is straightforward to model
this in a stochastic fashion. Suppose the set Y is drawn stochastically and so are the
gains from implementing design improvements ex ante (∆S∗) as well as the gains from
implementing them ex post (∆SR). If the buyer forms unbiased expectations about ∆S∗
and ∆SR, then all our results regarding the optimal procurement mechanism still hold.
18The buyer’s ex post utilities are directly obtained from Proposition 1. If a seller knows
the set Y , his price bid is obtained by solving US = 0.
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an auction is
EUBA (n, α, q, S̄, λ
B, λS)
= (1− q)nS̄ + nq(1− q)n−1[S̄ + α∆SR]
+ [1− (1− q)n − nq(1− q)n−1]
[





= S̄ + ∆SR
{
α[1− (1− q)n] + 1− α
1 + λB




The following proposition, which is our first main result, shows that there are
situations in which the buyer strictly prefers to negotiate with one seller and
other circumstances in which she strictly prefers to run an auction.
Proposition 4 (Auction vs. Negotiation). The buyer strictly prefers to run
an auction
(a) if the renegotiation costs are small (λB, λS close to zero) and/or
(b) if she has little bargaining power (α close to 0).
The buyer strictly prefers to negotiate
(c) if renegotiation is highly inefficient (λB, λS large) while ∆S∗ is suffi-
ciently large, and/or
(d) if her bargaining position is very strong (α close to 1) and the probability
with which sellers are aware of design improvements is large (q close to
1).
Moreover, the payoff advantage of running an auction, Ψ(n, α, q, S̄,∆S∗, λB, λS) ≡
EUBA − EUBN , is increasing in the number of potential sellers n.
The main advantage of negotiations are that they lead to early informa-
tion revelation. How important early information revelation is depends on the
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inefficiencies of renegotiation. If renegotiation is efficient, running an auction
with at least two competing sellers always outperforms negotiating with one
seller. If renegotiation is plagued by high inefficiencies then bilateral nego-
tiations outperform auctions even if there are many competing sellers in the
auction. One advantage of running an auction is that it leads to a strong
bargaining position of the buyer ex ante, i.e., the buyer can exploit the compe-
tition between sellers to get a larger share of the ex ante surplus. Therefore, if
the buyer’s bargaining position is weak in bilateral negotiations, an auction is
more likely to be superior. A second advantage of running an auction is that
it increases the probability with which design improvements are implemented
ex post. If there are sellers who know the set of superior projects, the auction
always selects one of these sellers as the contractor. The more sellers there
are the more likely it is that at least one of them is aware of the potential
project improvements. This is the reason why the payoff advantage of running
an auction is increasing in the number of sellers.
Auction vs. Negotiation: Extensions
Heterogeneous sellers: Suppose sellers are not equally likely to know about
project improvements. For the sake of the argument consider the extreme case
where only seller S1 is aware of superior projects with positive probability. This
is known to the buyer. Thus if the buyer decides to negotiate the procurement
contract with one seller, she will select seller S1 as the contractor. In this case,
negotiation outperforms auction if the probability of knowing superior projects







19In this case EUBN = αS̄+αq∆S
∗ while EUBA = (1− q)S̄+ q(S̄+α∆SR) = S̄+αq∆SR.
Note EUBN is the same as in (12) while EU
B
A is smaller than (13). Comparing EU
B
N and
EUBA yields condition (14).
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In other words, if there is sufficient heterogeneity among sellers and this is
known to the buyer, bilateral negotiations are more likely to be optimal. Com-
panies often have a good idea which supplier has the most expertise in provid-
ing the required product and thus is most likely to come up with ideas for a
superior project.
Correlated success probabilities: So far, we assumed that the probability
with which a seller finds project improvements is independent of the proba-
bilities with which the other sellers do so, i.e., the success probabilities are
uncorrelated. While correlation does not affect the performance of bilateral
negotiation it does affect the performance of the auction. The more strongly
success probabilities are correlated, the smaller is the probability that at least
one seller finds project improvements. This effect makes an auction less at-
tractive. On the other hand, the more success probabilities are correlated the
smaller is the probability that exactly one seller finds possible improvements.
If exactly one seller is aware of superior specifications, this seller receives a
rent in the auction. Thus, a reduction of the probability that exactly one
seller is successful makes the auction more attractive. Which of the two effects
dominates depends on the buyer’s bargaining power and the efficiency loss if
the price is increased. If α and λB are large, the successful seller does not
get a high rent if he is the only one who is successful. In this case the first
effect outweighs the second and thus the auction becomes less attractive as
correlation increases. This is stated formally in the following proposition for
the case of two sellers.
Proposition 5 (Correlated Probabilities). Let n = 2. The payoff advantage
of running an auction Ψ is decreasing in the coefficient of correlation if and
only if (1− α)/α ≤ 1 + λB.
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4 Investments in Finding Project Improvements
So far we took the information structure as exogenously given. The infor-
mation structure may be very different, however, for different procurement
mechanisms: bilateral negotiation may give different incentives to investigate
possible project improvements than an auction. What are the incentives of the
seller(s) to invest into finding project improvements? In order to answer this
question, we replace stage 1 of the baseline model by an investment stage. At
stage 1 each seller can invest into finding more efficient project specifications
than ȳ. If a seller invests q ≥ 0 at cost k(q), he finds with probability q the
set of superior projects Y , where each y ∈ Y satisfies Assumption 1. The
investment cost function satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 2. The investment cost function, k(q), is strictly increasing and
convex and satisfies the Inada conditions, i.e.,
(i) k(0) = 0, and for all q > 0: k′(q) > 0 and k′′(q) > 0;
(ii) limq→0 k
′(q) = 0, and limq→1 k(q) =∞.
In order to obtain a closed form solution and unambiguous comparative
static results we will sometimes impose the assumption of a quadratic cost
function, i.e., k(q) = κ
2
q2 with κ > (1− α)∆S∗.20
Note that the outcome of renegotiation and the sellers’ incentives for in-
formation disclosure are unaffected by how the probabilities are determined at
stage 1. Thus we can directly start investigating sellers’ investment incentives
under the two procurement mechanisms.
20With a quadratic cost function, κ > (1− α)∆S∗ ensures that in equilibrium the proba-
bility of finding a project improvement is smaller than 1.
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4.1 Incentives for Finding Project Improvements
Negotiation: Suppose that the buyer decided to negotiate with one seller.
In this case the contractor will reveal any possibilities for project improvements
before the contract is signed and his expected utility is given by
EUSN = q(1− α)[v∗ − c∗] + (1− q)(1− α)[v̄ − c̄]− k(q)
= (1− α)S̄ + q(1− α)∆S∗ − k(q) (15)
The contractor’s optimal investment under negotiation, qN , is characterized in
the next proposition.
Proposition 6 (Investment Incentives under Negotiation). The probability
that the contractor who negotiates with the buyer finds possible project im-
provements is fully characterized by
k′(qN) = (1− α)∆S∗ . (16)
Moreover, with bilateral negotiations the success probability qN(α,∆S∗) of the
contractor is









These findings are highly intuitive. The larger the buyer’s bargaining
power, the smaller is the contractor’s ex post share of the surplus generated
by the investment, so he will invest less. Furthermore, the larger the surplus
generated by the investment, the stronger are his investment incentives.
Auction: Now, we consider the case of an auction. Recall that a seller
makes a positive profit if and only if he is the only seller who found the project
improvement. In this case he wins the auction at p̄ = c̄. After the contract
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is signed he reveals the possible project improvement and renegotiates. So in




[(v(yR)− v̄)−(1+λB)(1+λS)(c(yR)− c̄)] = 1− α
1 + λB
∆SR . (17)
This happens with probability qi
∏









For given investments of all sellers j 6= i, seller i’s optimal investment qAi
is determined by the first-order condition. In the symmetric equilibrium all
sellers choose the same success probability qA, which is characterized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Investment Incentives under the Auction). In the symmetric
equilibrium of the investment game the probability that a seller finds possible
project improvements is fully characterized by
k′(qA) = (1− qA)n−1 1− α
1 + λB
∆SR . (18)
Moreover, with an auction the success probability qA(n, α, λB, λS) of any given
seller is








(c) decreasing in the adjustment cost parameters λB and λS.
The findings are again highly intuitive. First, the more potential sellers
there are, the lower is the probability that seller i is the only one who is
successful in finding a project improvement and thus the less profitable is his
investment. Second, the larger the bargaining power of the buyer, the smaller
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is the share of the renegotiation surplus that is going to the successful seller
who wins the auction, which reduces sellers’ investment incentives. Finally, an
increase of the adjustment costs λB and λS reduces the renegotiation surplus
and thus the payoff going to the contractor, which in turn reduces sellers’
incentives to invest.
Auction vs. negotiation: Which of the two procurement mechanisms gen-
erates the higher individual incentives to invest in finding project improve-
ments? A comparison of Propositions 6 and 7 shows that qN > qA. This is
implied by the fact that the surplus generated by the investment is larger with
negotiations where the seller reveals any possible project improvements early
while there is inefficient delay with an auction. Furthermore, with an auction
a seller who is successful in finding project improvements is not guaranteed to
benefit from his success. He benefits only if no other seller is also successful.
Corollary 1. The success probability of a seller with whom the buyer negotiates
is always higher than the success probability of a seller who participates in an
auction, no matter how many potential sellers there are, i.e. for all n ≥ 2
qN > qA. (19)
Corollary 1 shows that there is a second tradeoff. The auction reduces the
price that the buyer has to pay as compared to negotiations, but it also reduces
the incentives of each seller to invest into finding project improvements.
The buyer is less interested in the investment incentives of each indi-
vidual seller but more in the aggregate probability of implementing design
improvements ex post. With negotiation the contractor’s individual invest-
ment, qN , is also the probability with which design improvements are im-
plemented ex post, but this is not the case for the auction. With an auc-
tion, the probability of implementing design improvements ex post depends
on the number of sellers n ex ante. How does the number of sellers affect
28
the probability that at least one seller finds the project improvement? Let
QA(n, α, λB, λS) ≡ 1− (1− qA)n = 1− exp{n ln(1− qA)} denote the probabil-


















The total effect of an increase of the numbers of bidders on the probability
that at least one bidder will find the project improvement can be split up in a
discouragement effect and a sampling effect. Each additional bidder makes it
less likely that bidder i is the only bidder who is successful which discourages
his investment. This effect is always negative. Each additional seller, however,
increases the probability that at least one seller will be successful. This is the
sampling effect which is always positive. The sum of the two effects can be
positive or negative.
Proposition 8 (Probability of Implementing Project Improvements). The
probability of implementing project improvements
(i) is larger with negotiations than with an auction, i.e qN > QA, if λB
and/or λS are sufficiently large,
(ii) is smaller with negotiations than with an auction, i.e qN < QA ∀ n ≥ 2,
if λB = λS = 0 and k(q) = κ
2





If the buyer runs an auction, then the effect of an increase of the number of













with dQA/dn > 0 if and only if the term in square brackets is positive, which




The proposition shows that there are parameter values such the probability
of implementing project improvements is larger if the buyer chooses to nego-
tiate. This is easiest to see for the case of prohibitive cost of renegotiation,
so that the parties do not renegotiate but are always stuck with the initial
contract. In this case, if the buyer runs an auction, no seller has an incentive
to investigate project improvements. However, if the buyer chooses to nego-
tiate the procurement contract, the contractor has a strict incentive to invest
in finding project improvements. In case renegotiation is highly efficient, on
the other hand, the probability of implementing project improvements can be
larger with an auction, which typically is the case if there are many potential
sellers. More precisely, this probability is increasing in the number of bid-
ders if the cost function is sufficiently convex, which implies that each seller’s
probability of finding project improvements is small in equilibrium.
4.2 The Optimal Procurement Mechanism
Now, we can compare the performance of the two mechanisms for the case
with endogenous probabilities of finding project improvements. If the buyer
negotiates with one seller, her expected payoff is
EUBN (α, S̄,∆S
∗) = αS̄ + qNα∆S∗. (22)
If, on the other hand, the buyer runs an auction, her expected payoff is given
by
EUBA (n, α, S̄, λ








The following proposition shows that the main result from our baseline model,
Proposition 4, carries over to the situation with endogenous investments.
Proposition 9 (Auction vs. Negotiation). The buyer strictly prefers to run
an auction
30
(a) if the renegotiation cost is small (λB, λS close to 0) and if the probability
that at least one seller will find the project improvement is larger with an
auction than with renegotiation and/or
(b) if she has little bargaining power (α close to 0).
The buyer strictly prefers to negotiate
(c) if renegotiation is very inefficient (λB, λS large) while ∆S∗ is sufficiently
large and/or
(d) her bargaining power is very strong (α is close to 1) and sellers’ cost
function is not too convex (k′′(0) close to zero).
Auctions outperform negotiations if renegotiation is relatively efficient. In
this case the fact that sellers will not reveal possible project improvements
early if the buyer runs an auction is not too costly for the buyer. Furthermore,
even though each seller participating in the auction has a smaller incentive
to investigate possible project improvements than the one seller with whom
the buyer negotiates, the probability that at least one seller will find a project
improvement can be larger with an auction than with negotiations (by Propo-
sition 8). Hence, in this case running an auction yields a strictly higher payoff
for the buyer (and is more efficient). The buyer also prefers the auction if
her bargaining position is weak. The auction makes sure that she gets at
least S̄ > 0 no matter how small α, while her payoff from negotiation (and
renegotiation) goes to zero if α goes to zero.
On the other hand, if renegotiation is very inefficient, the parties are always
stuck with ȳ and no seller has an incentive to investigate project improvements
if there is an auction. In this case the buyer’s payoff from the auction is
restricted to S̄, while she would get αS̄ + αqN∆S∗ if she negotiates. Thus,
if the potential for project improvements (∆S∗) is sufficiently large the buyer
prefers to negotiate.
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Finally, if the buyer has all the bargaining power, no seller is going to
invest into finding project improvements. In this case there is no difference
between the two procurement mechanisms. However, if, starting at α = 1,
the bargaining power of the buyer is reduced, then the investment incentive
of the seller with whom the buyer negotiates is differently effected than the
incentives of sellers in the auction. In particular, if the cost function is not too
convex and α close to 1, negotiation is accompanied with higher investment
incentives than the auction. More precisely, the reduction in α has a strictly
positive first-order effect on the buyer’s payoff if she negotiates with one seller,
while the first-order effect is zero if she runs an auction.
The next proposition offers some additional comparative static results.
Proposition 10 (Auction vs. Negotiation: Comparative Statics). The payoff
advantage of running an auction, Ψ(n, α, S̄,∆S∗, λB, λS) = EUBA − EUBN , is
(a) weakly decreasing in the renegotiation costs λB and λS;
(b) strictly decreasing in the maximal additional surplus ∆S∗;
(c) strictly increasing in surplus achieved without implementing project im-
provements S̄.
The cost of renegotiation affect the performance of an auction but not
the performance of renegotiation. Hence running an auction becomes more
attractive if the costs of renegotiation go down. Similarly, an increase of ∆S∗
(keeping everything else constant) makes negotiations more attractive without
directly affecting the performance of auctions. Finally, if S̄ increases the buyer
captures all of this increase with an auction, while she gets only fraction α of
this if she negotiates.
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5 Conclusions
The preceding analysis highlights two important benefits of using negotiations
rather than auctions in procurement. First, negotiations give an incentive
to the seller to reveal possible design improvements early. In contrast, in an
auction all bidders prefer not to reveal this information before the contract is
signed. Thus, a contract that was allocated by an auction is more likely to
be renegotiated. There is ample empirical evidence that the renegotiation of
procurement contracts is often very costly and inefficient. Thus, if a complex
good is to be procured where the expertise of the seller is of crucial importance
for its optimal design it may be better for the buyer to negotiate with one
preselected seller in order to reduce the cost of renegotiation.
Second, negotiations give stronger incentives to investigate potential project
improvements. An auction diminishes the return of this investment because
the surplus of a project improvement is reduced in the inefficient renegotiation
process. Furthermore, each seller has a diminished incentive to invest because
he benefits from his investment only if he is the only seller finding the im-
provement. On the other hand, because there are several sellers participating
in the auction, there is also a sampling effect which may increase the proba-
bility that at least one seller finds the project improvement. On balance, if
renegotiation is very costly, then it is likely that negotiations will implement
project improvements with a higher probability. These arguments may explain
why negotiations are so often used to allocate private procurement contracts.
To keep the analysis simple our model abstracts from many real world
complications that affect the tradeoff between auctions and negotiations. For
example, we assume that all sellers are identical. If there are cost differences
between different sellers or if different sellers have different skills for finding
project improvements, an auction has the advantage to select the most efficient
seller, but it will also leave a rent to this seller. On the other hand, if the buyer
33
knows who the most efficient seller is, she can select this seller and directly
negotiate with him. Thus, negotiations are more likely to be optimal if there
are few competing sellers with large efficiency differences and if the buyer
knows the efficiency of the potential sellers well.
We also assumed that the probability that one seller finds a project im-
provement is independent of the probabilities that all the other sellers are
successful. If these successes are positively correlated, the sampling effect is
reduced, the probability that at least one seller finds the project improvement
goes down, and sellers in the auction have a lower incentive to invest. All of
these effects make negotiations more attractive.
Moreover, we ignored the possibility of favoritism and collusion. It is often
argued that an important benefit of auctions is that they make favoritism and
collusion more difficult. In fact, this is the reason why there are legal rules
in many countries that require competitive tendering in public procurement.
However, in a recent paper Gretschko and Wambach (2014) show that an
auction may be more prone to favoritism than negotiations.21
Finally, the reader might wonder whether the buyer can benefit from using
a two-stage procedure in order to award the procurement contract, i.e., a
procedure similar to architectural competitions. For example, at the first stage
the buyer could award a fixed price for the best design proposal. At the second
stage the procurement contract for the best design is auctioned off. Such
a procedure may enhance information revelation compared to our one-stage
auction but does not implement fully efficient information exchange ex ante.
To see this suppose that there is one seller with a brilliant idea who is very
confident to win the first stage competition, i.e., to win the fixed price for the
best design. This seller will also win the fixed price when making a proposal
21In Gretschko and Wambach (2014) the buyer has to delegate the procurement process
to an agent who may bias the auction rules or the negotiation outcome in order to favor his
most preferred seller. The authors show that biasing the auction rules may be more harmful
than biasing the negotiation outcome.
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which is slightly worse than the best design he is aware of. By doing so, he not
only receives the fixed price but can additionally benefit from renegotiating
the contract ex post. The analysis of multi-stage procurement procedures is
an important and fascinating topic for future research, but it is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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Proof of Proposition 1. We introduce some notation first. Then we charac-
terize under what circumstances renegotiation takes place. Finally, we prove
equations (6)–(9) of the proposition, starting with the specification that is
implemented at stage 3, yR.
Define
∆SR(y) ≡ v(y)− v(ȳ)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)[c(y)− c(ȳ)], (A.1)
and let
Y R ≡ {y ∈ Y ∪ {ȳ} | y ∈ arg max ∆SR(y)}. (A.2)
In words, Y R is the set containing all specifications y ∈ {Y ∪ {ȳ}} that maxi-
mize the “surplus” generated by renegotiation, ∆SR(·).
The renegotiation contract maximizes the generalized Nash product, which
is given by








Thus, (yR, pR) solves the following problem:
max
(y,p)∈{Y ∪{ȳ}}×R
GNP (y, p) (A.4)
subject to:
v(y)− v(x̄)− (1 + λB)(p− p̄) ≥ 0 (IRB)
p− p̄− (1 + λS)[c(y)− c(ȳ)] ≥ 0. (IRS)
For a given y the constraints are easiest to satisfy if the price mark-up is as
low as possible, i.e., if
p− p̄ = (1 + λS)[c(y)− c(ȳ)]. (A.5)
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At this mark-up the seller is indifferent between the new and the old contract.
The buyer (weakly) prefers the new contract if
∆SR(y) = v(y)− v(ȳ)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)[c(y)− c(ȳ)] ≥ 0. (A.6)
Hence, only yR ∈ {Y ∪ {ȳ}} for which ∆SR(yR) ≥ 0 can be reached by
renegotiation. This implies that renegotiation takes place—in a strict sense—
only if there is a y ∈ Y so that ∆SR(y) > 0.
Now, we show that yR has to maximize ∆SR. Assume, in contradiction,
that the parties agreed to trade (y, p) with y /∈ Y R. The generalized Nash
product is given by








Alternatively, the parties could trade ŷ ∈ Y R at price
p̂ = p+ (1 + λS)[c(ŷ)− c(y)], (A.8)
where p̂ is constructed so that the seller is indifferent between (y, p) and (ŷ, p̂).
The generalized Nash product amounts to






p− p̄− (1 + λS)[c(y)− c(x̄)]
}1−α
. (A.9)
Note that GNP (ŷ, p̂) > GNP (y, p) if and only if
v(ŷ)− v(x̄)− (1 + λB)(p− p̄)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)[c(ŷ)− c(y)]
> v(y)− v(x̄)− (1 + λB)(p− p̄), (A.10)
which is equivalent to
∆SR(ŷ, y) ≡ v(ŷ)− v(y)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)[c(ŷ)− c(y)] > 0 (A.11)
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Note that ∆SR(y, y) = 0 and that ŷ ∈ arg maxz ∆SR(z, y). By assumption
y /∈ Y R and thus ∆SR(ŷ, y) > 0. Put differently, the specification implemented
at stage 3 satisfies,
yR ∈ arg max
y∈{Y ∪{ȳ}}
∆SR(y).
Note that yR = yR(λB, λS, ȳ).
Finally, from Proposition 2 by Herweg and Schmidt (2014), it is readily




[v(yR)− v(ȳ)] + α(1 + λS)[c(yR)− c(ȳ)]
which gives rise to the expected payoffs (8) and (9).
Proof of Proposition 2. If the seller reveals Y to the buyer, the parties solve
max
y,p
[v(y)− p]α · [p− c(y)]1−α . (A.12)
The solution to this problem is y∗ = arg max{v(y) − c(y)} and p∗ = c(y∗) +
(1− α)[v(y∗)− c(y∗)], so the seller’s payoff in the negotiation game (N) if he
knows Y and informs (I) the buyer immediately is
US(NI) = (1− α)(v∗ − c∗). (A.13)
If the seller does not inform the buyer about possible project improvements
(either because he did not find them or because he chose not to reveal Y to the
buyer), then the GNBS implies that the parties will agree to trade project ȳ
at price p̄ = c̄+ (1−α)[v̄− c̄].22 However, if the seller did find possible project
22Strictly speaking, if the seller knows Y but does not inform the buyer about it, initial
negotiation takes place with asymmetric information. The GNBS is a concept for bargaining
under symmetric information. The seller does not reveal his information, thus both parties
behave as if they agree that trading specification ȳ is optimal. This is exactly what is
characterized by the GNBS in this case. In Appendix B we show that the identical result
can be obtained for a bargaining game where the asymmetric information is taken explicitly
into account.
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improvements he will reveal them at stage 3 and renegotiate (R). In this case
the parties renegotiate to the contract characterized by Proposition 1 and the
seller’s payoff is
US(NR) = p̄− c̄+ 1− α
1 + λB
[(v(yR)− v̄)− (1 +λB)(1 +λS)(c(yR)− c̄)] (A.14)
Note that y∗ ∈ arg max{(v(y) − v̄) − (c(y) − c̄)} and yR ∈ arg max{(v(y) −
v̄)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)(c(y)− c̄)}. Hence
(v(y∗)− v̄)− (c(y∗)− c̄) ≥ (v(yR)− v̄)− (c(yR)− c̄)
> (v(yR)− v̄)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)(c(yR)− c̄).
(A.15)
Therefore, the seller’s utility if he renegotiates is smaller than his utility if he
informs the buyer before the contract is signed:
US(NR) = p̄− c̄+ 1− α
1 + λB
[(v(yR)− v̄)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)(c(yR)− c̄)]
< p̄− c̄+ 1− α
1 + λB
[(v(y∗)− v̄)− (c(y∗)− c̄)]
< p̄− c̄+ (1− α)[(v(y∗)− v̄)− (c(y∗)− c̄)]
= c̄+ (1− α)(v̄ − c̄)− c̄+ (1− α)(v∗ − c∗)− (1− α)(v̄ − c̄)
= (1− α)(v∗ − c∗) = US(NI).
Proof of Proposition 3. If one of the sellers informs the buyer about Y the
buyer will run the auction on project y∗ and each seller makes a profit of 0.
If no seller informs the buyer about Y the buyer will auction off project ȳ.
Suppose that in this case seller i wins the auction and knows about possible
project improvements. He will then renegotiate at stage 3, and his payoff in
the auction (A) after renegotiation (R) is
US(AR) = p̄− c̄+ 1− α
1 + λB
[(v(yR)− v̄)− (1 +λB)(1 +λS)(c(yR)− c̄)] . (A.16)
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[(v(yR)− v̄)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)(c(yR)− c̄)] . (A.17)
If there are two or more sellers who found the project improvement, one of them
wins the auction and all sellers make an expected profit of zero. Similarly, if
no seller found the project improvement, all sellers will bid bi = c̄ and make
an expected profit of zero. However, if seller i is the only seller who found the





[(v(yR)− v̄)− (1 + λB)(1 + λS)(c(yR)− c̄)] > 0 . (A.18)
Hence, it optimal for all sellers who found project improvements not to reveal
this information before the auction takes place.
Proof of Proposition 4. The buyer strictly prefers to run an auction if and only
if Ψ = EUBA − EUBN > 0, where
Ψ = (1− α)S̄ + ∆SR×{
α [1− (1− q)n] + 1− α
1 + λB
[




(a) If renegotiation costs are small, i.e., λB → 0 and λS → 0, then ∆SR →
∆S∗. Hence, we have








1− (1− q)n − nq(1− q)n−1
]}
> 0. (A.20)
(b) For α→ 0, we have









(c) If renegotiation costs are prohibitively large, ∆SR = 0. In this case we
have
Ψ = (1− α)S̄ − qα∆S∗, (A.22)
which is negative for ∆S∗ sufficiently large.
(d) For α→ 1, we have
Ψ = ∆SR[1− (1− q)n]− q∆S∗, (A.23)
which is negative for q sufficiently close to 1.
To complete the proof, we show that ∂Ψ/∂n ≥ 0 (with strict inequality if


















α ln(1− q)(1− q) + 1− α
1 + λB
[ln(1− q)(1− q) + q + nq ln(1− q)]
}
. (A.25)
Thus, ∂Ψ/∂n ≥ 0 if
ln(1− q)(1− q) + q + nq ln(1− q) ≤ 0. (A.26)
The above inequality is hardest to satisfy for n = 2 (lowest possible n) and
thus ∂Ψ/∂n ≥ 0 if
Γ(q) ≡ ln(1− q)(1 + q) + q ≤ 0. (A.27)
Noting that Γ(q) is strictly decreasing and approaches 0 for q → 1 completes
the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 5. The information of supplier Si ∈ {S1, S2} is denoted
by Ii ∈ {0, 1}, where Ii = 1 means that supplier Si is aware of the set Y and
Ii = 0 means that he is unaware. Let ρ ∈ [0, 1] denote the Pearson corre-
lation coefficient23 The correlated probabilities are displayed in the following
probability table:
I2 = 0 I2 = 1
∑
I1 = 0 (1− q)[ρ+ (1− ρ)(1− q)] q(1− q)(1− ρ) 1− q
I1 = 1 q(1− q)(1− ρ) q[ρ+ (1− ρ)q] q∑
1− q q 1
Table 1: Correlated probability table for n = 2
For ρ → 0, the success probabilities are uncorrelated, while for ρ → 1
we have perfect correlation. The buyer’s expected utility from negotiation is
independent of the degree of correlation ρ. The buyer’s expected utility from
running an auction is























which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. The contractor’s expected payoff is strictly concave
in q and due to the imposed Inada conditions the optimal investment has
to be interior. Thus, the success probability of the contractor, qN , is fully
characterized by
(1− α)∆S∗ − k′(qN) = 0 (A.29)
23ρ = cov(I1, I2)/[σ(I1)σ(I2)], where cov(·) denotes the covariance and σ(·) the standard
deviation.
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= − (1− α)
−k′′(qN)
> 0. (A.31)
Proof of Proposition 7. If a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of the invest-
ment game exists, the equilibrium investment of each seller, qA, is characterized
by the following first-order condition:
(1− qA)n−1 1− α
1 + λB
∆SR = k′(qA). (A.32)
The comparative statics results follow from the implicit function theorem. Let
Φ = (1− qA)n−1 1− α
1 + λB
∆SR − k′(qA) = 0 . (A.33)
(a) Recall that d
dx









(1− qA)n−1 ln(1− qA) 1−α
1+λB
∆SR























(c) Note that ∆SR depends on λj not only directly but also indirectly
through yR = yR(λB, λS). Thus, ∆SR is not everywhere continuously
differentiable with respect to λj. From the definition of y
R it is read-
ily obtained that ∆SR is continuous in λj and strictly decreasing in λj
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whenever ∆SR > 0. At points at which ∆SR is differentiable, we can

























































Note that qA is continuous in ∆SR and thus continuous in λj. Hence,
we can conclude from equation (A.36) and (A.37) that qA is decreasing
in λS and λB, respectively.
Finally, we argue that a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of the invest-





First, note that a seller i never chooses qi = 1 because limq→1 k(q) =∞. This
implies that Πj 6=i(1 − qj) =: X > 0. With X > 0 and k′(0) = 0 it always
pays off for a seller to invest a small amount, i.e., qi > 0 which implies that














Note that X is decreasing in qj for all j 6= i, so that i invests less if its rivals in-
vest more. In the limit we have limX→0 q
R
i (X) = 0 and limX→1 q
R




= k′(q̄). The reaction functions are all symmetric and contin-
uously decreasing and approach zero if Πj 6=i(1 − qj) → 1. Thus, a symmetric
qA exists at which all reaction functions intersect each other.
Proof of Corollary 1. It has to be shown that for all n ≥ 2: qN > qA(n). Note
that
(1− α)∆S∗ = (1− α)[(v(y∗)− v̄)− (c(y∗)− c̄)]




> (1− qA)n−1 1− α
1 + λB
∆SR . (A.41)
Thus, convexity of k(·) implies the result.
Proof of Proposition 8. First, we show that there are parameter values so that
qN > QA and so that QA > qN .
(i) qN > QA(n) for all n ≥ 2: By (11) we know that if λB and/or λS are suf-
ficiently large then ∆SR = 0. Furthermore, qA(n) is fully characterized
by FOC (18), which requires
k′(qA) = (1− qA)n−1 1− α
1 + λB
∆SR.
∆SR = 0 implies qA = 0 for all n ≥ 2 which implies QA(n) = 0 for all
n ≥ 2. On the other hand, qN , which is fully characterized by (16), is
independent of λB and λS. Thus, if λB and/or λS are sufficiently large
then QA(n) = 0 < qN for all n ≥ 2.
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(ii) QA(n) > qN for all n ≥ 2: By Proposition 1 we know that if λB = λS = 0
then ∆SR = ∆S∗. Suppose that k(q) = κ
2






Furthermore, by (18) we have for n = 2





QA(2) = 1− (1− qA)2 = qA(2− qA) = (1− α)
2(∆S∗)2 + 2(1− α)κ∆S∗
[κ+ (1− α)∆S∗]2
.
Thus, QA(2) > qN if and only if
(1− α)2(∆S∗)2 + 2(1− α)κ∆S∗












It remains to be shown that QA(n) > qN for all n ≥ 2. By (21) (to be
shown below) we have that dQ
dn
> 0 iff (1− qA)k′′(qA)−k′(qA) > 0. Using
the quadratic cost function and the fact that dq
A
dn


















∆S∗, then QA(n) > qN for all
n ≥ 2.
Now we show (21). Let Q ≡ 1 − (1 − qA(n))n. In the following we often
suppress the superscript A and the dependence of n, i.e., we write q instead
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of qA(n). In the symmetric equilibrium, each seller’s probability of finding the
project improvements is given by




Thus, Q can be written as




Differentiating Q with respect to n yields
dQ
dn
= − 1 + λ
B









Hence, dQ/dn > 0 if and only if the term in square brackets is positive.



















k(1 + λB) + (1− α)∆SR
.
Thus, qA(2) < 1
2
iff κ > 1−α
1+λB
∆SR. This condition is always satisfied because
κ > (1− α)∆S∗.
Proof of Proposition 9. Comparing (22) and (23) we have that EUBA > EU
B
N
if and only if
Ψ = (1− α)S̄︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0












(a) The first and the third term of this expression are clearly positive, so
consider the second term. If λB = λS = 0, then ∆SR = ∆S∗. Thus,
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Q(n)∆SR−qN∆S∗ = (Q(n)−qN)∆S∗. If Q(n) > qN this term is strictly
positive and the auction outperforms negotiations. Only if the incentive
effect of negotiations is very strong, i.e. if qN > Q(n), is it possible that
the sum of the three terms becomes negative.
(b) If α goes to zero, the second term goes to 0 while the first term goes to
S̄. Thus, Ψ > 0.
(c) If λB and λS are sufficiently large such that there does not exist a y ∈
Y with v(y) − v̄ − (1 + λB)(1 + λS)(c(y) − c̄) > 0, then there is no
renegotiation. The parties will always trade ȳ, and thus ∆SR = 0. In
this case the buyer prefers to negotiate if (1− α)S̄ < qNα∆S∗, which is





(d) If α = 1 then qN = qA = 0. Therefore, the buyer’s payoff is v̄ − c̄ no
matter whether he negotiates or runs an auction. If α is reduced (starting












































Thus, the first-order effect from reducing α at α = 1 is zero. On the
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< 0. The buyer’s payoff increases, but now the first order
effect of a reduction of α is strictly positive. Thus, for α close to 1,
negotiations are better than auctions.
Proof of Proposition 10. The function Ψ is given in equation (A.42). Recall




= 1− α > 0 (A.46)










The partial derivatives with respect to λi are somewhat more complicated.
Note that ∆SR is a continuously decreasing function in λi and thus differen-
tiable almost everywhere. Thus, the partial derivative of Ψ with respect to λi
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because dQ/dλS ≤ 0, dqA/dλS ≤ 0, and d∆SR/dλS ≤ 0.


























− n(1− qA)n−1 dq
A
dλB






A final remark is in order. Strictly speaking ∆S∗ is not an exogenous
variable of the model. The exogenous variable that affects ∆S∗ is the set
of superior projects Y . Enlarging the set Y does not only change ∆S∗ but
probably also ∆SR. The effects of a larger set Y on the payoff advantage of
running an auction is thus more complicated and these effects are typically
opposing.
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B Bargaining with Asymmetric Information
In the paper we employ the GNBS in order to determine the outcome of ini-
tial negotiation as well as ex post renegotiation. Initially negotiation takes
place under asymmetric information if the contractor knows the set of supe-
rior projects Y but has not informed the buyer about it at stage 1 of the game.
The GNBS does not take this asymmetric information explicitly into account.
In the following, we discuss an alternative bargaining game which takes the
asymmetric information explicitly into account and show that it is isomorphic
to the application of the GNBS.
Suppose the bargaining game at stage 2 and the renegotiation game at stage
3 proceeds as follows: At the beginning of stage 2, nature determines the party
that can make take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offers throughout the game (at stage
2 and stage 3). The buyer can make the TIOLI offer with probability α ∈ (0, 1)
and the contractor makes the TIOLI offer with the converse probability 1−α.
With asymmetric information being only an issue with bilateral negotia-
tions, we will focus on negotiation as procurement mechanism in the following.
First, suppose the draw by nature determined that the contractor can make
the offers. If the initial contract specifies ȳ at price p̄ and the contractor is
aware of Y , there is scope for renegotiation at stage 3. When the contractor





The contractor’s utility from this offer is
US = pR − c(y)− λS[c(y)− c̄]




v(y)− v̄ − (1 + λS)(1 + λB)c(y)
]
, (B.2)
which is maximized at y = yR.
When making the initial contract offer and the contractor has not revealed
Y , the optimal offer is specification ȳ and price p̄ = v̄. Thus, the contractor’s
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utility amounts to




v(yR)− v̄ − (1 + λS)(1 + λB)c(yR)
]
. (B.3)
If, on the other hand, the buyer can make the TIOLI offer, the contractor
receives a zero utility. Thus, the contractor’s expected utility from disclosing
his private information at stage 1 is
EUS(NR) = (1−α)(v̄−c̄)+ 1− α
1 + λB
{




Note that (B.4) is equal to (A.14).
Now, suppose the contractor revealed Y at stage 1. If the contractor makes
the TIOLI offer, he offers y∗ at price p̄ = v∗. His payoff in this case is
US = v∗ − c∗. (B.5)
If the buyer can make the offers, then US = 0. Thus, the contractor’s expected
utility from revealing his information at stage 1 is
EUS(NI) = (1− α)(v∗ − c∗). (B.6)
Recall that (B.6) is equal to (A.13).
Under the alternative bargaining game, the contractor’s expected payoffs
from information disclosure and information revelation are exactly the same
as those obtained by applying the GNBS. Thus, the contractor here has a
strict incentive to reveal his private information at stage 1, i.e., EUS(NI) >
EUS(NR).
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